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Abstract
This paper attends to two main tasks. First, I introduce the notion of perspectival
disagreement in science. Second, I relate perspectival disagreement in science to the
broader issue of realism about science: how to maintain realist ontological commit-
ments in the face of perspectival disagreement among scientists? I argue that often
enough perspectival disagreement is not at the level of the scientific knowledge claims
but rather of the methodological and justificatory principles. I introduce and clarify
the notion of ‘agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing’ with an episode from the
history of modern physics: namely, how we came to agree about the electric charge
as a minimal natural unit despite different scientific perspectives and associated data-
to-phenomena inferences available for it in the period 1897–1906.
Keywords Realism · Perspectivism · Disagreement · Electric charge ·
Data-to-phenomena inferences · M. Planck · J.J. Thomson
1 Introduction: realism and the history of the electron
Scientific disagreement has been a battleground for realism in science. Is not dis-
agreement among scientists a powerful argument against realism? Thomas Kuhn put
forward this point in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in the context of the
controversy surrounding Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen:
Though, undoubtedly correct, the sentence, “Oxygen was discovered”, misleads
by suggesting that discovering something is a single simple act assimilable to our
usual (and also questionable) concept of seeing… any attempt to date the discov-
ery must inevitably be arbitrary because discovering a new sort of phenomenon
is necessarily a complex event, one which involves recognizing both that some-
thing is and what it is. Note, for example, that if oxygen were dephlogisticated
B Michela Massimi
michela.massimi@ed.ac.uk
1 Chair of Philosophy of Science, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The
University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK
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air for us, we should insist without hesitation that Priestley had discovered it,
though we would still not know quite when. (Kuhn 1962/1996, p. 55)
Scientists often disagree both that something is and about what it is. This kind of
scientific disagreement is of great interest to historians of science, who might want
to establish who really discovered some entity—e.g. whether it was Joseph Priestley
rather thanAntoine Lavoisier who discoveredwhatwe now call ‘oxygen’;1 or, whether
it was George J. Stoney or J.J. Thomson who really discovered the electron, given that
in his Nobel Prize speech Thomson was still calling his entity a ‘corpuscle’.2 But,
historiographical debates aside, disagreement that something is and about what it is
also raises pressing questions for philosophers with realist leanings. How are we to
spell out the realist commitment in cases where scientists disagree about the nature of
the entity? What is it like to be a realist in the face of scientific disagreement?
This paper takes some steps towards answering this question by looking at the case
of the electric charge. What is to be said about the electric charge? Has there ever been
any disagreement about it? As it happens, at the turn of the last century, there was a
disagreement about the nature of the electron as the bearer of the electric charge. And
there were also different views about the electric charge and the reasons why it is a
‘natural unit’. Digging (briefly for limits of space here) into the history of this scientific
disagreement around 1897–1906 is instructive for two different reasons. First, it helps
elucidate the nature of disagreement. This was rooted not in scientists accepting or
denying pieces of evidence, but rather in the way in which pieces of evidence, or,
better, data, were embedded in different scientific perspectives and used for inferring
a variety of phenomena, from which the electric charge could in turn be inferred.
Second, a brief foray into the history of the electric charge can help us understand the
exact nature of the realist commitment that is compatible with what I call ‘perspectival
disagreement’.
In brief, this paper elucidates how it is possible to be realist about the electric
charge—understood as a minimal natural unit, not as a property—while also perspec-
tivally disagreeing about how data-to-phenomena inferences provide evidence for it.
My goal in what follows is to explain how this realist commitment was borne out of
data-to-phenomena inferences that were perspectival every inch of the way. Or, better,
I aim to explain how it is possible to be realist that there exists a natural unit of charge
and about what it is, despite perspectival disagreements concerning how to reach this
conclusion.
To be clear: I will be defending neither traditional scientific realism nor property
realism. The realism I defend here is not downstream of any prior commitment to a
true (final? God’s-eye?) theory of the electron (with charge as one of its theoretical
posits). Nor is my realist commitment akin to some version of property realism. For
I do not take the electric charge as a Lewisian natural property in a Humean mosaic
of sparse natural properties. Instead, I take electric charge as a feature involved in
a number of robust phenomena in Bogen and Woodward’s sense (1988): from the
bending of cathode rays in the presence of an electric or magnetic field, to the elec-
trolysis of water; from metal conductivity to blackbody radiation. It is here argued
1 See Chang (2012, 2015), and Kusch (2015) for a recent debate.
2 For this historiographical debate, see, for example, Falconer (2001) and Achinstein (2001).
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that our realist commitment to the electric charge is borne out of data-to-phenomena
inferences that are thoroughgoingly perspectival (building on Massimi 2007, 2011).
Data are perspectival in being harvested within well-defined scientific perspectives,
and the inferences from the data to the phenomena are themselves perspectival in that
the evidential line of reasoning “If data D, then conclude that phenomenon P” is also
embedded in a well-defined scientific perspective.
By ‘scientific perspective’ I mean (as in Massimi 2018b, p. 152) the actual—his-
torically and intellectually situated—scientific practice of a real scientific community
at a given historical time. Scientific practice should here be understood to include: (1)
the body of scientific knowledge claims advanced by the scientific community at the
time; (2) the experimental, theoretical, and technological resources available to the
scientific community at the time to reliably make those scientific knowledge claims;
and (3) second-order (methodological-epistemic) principles that can justify the scien-
tific knowledge claims advanced. Scientific perspectives so understood are different
from Kuhn’s scientific paradigms. Nor is perspectival disagreement to be conflated
with Kuhn’s ‘working in a new world’ type of scenarios.3
Scientists endorsing different scientific perspectives produce different perspecti-
val representations of the same phenomenon (e.g. electric charge), which cannot be
equated with Kuhnian Gestalt switches because perspectives do not mould perspecti-
val facts; they do not act as cookie-cutters in the worldly dough. Scientific perspectives
deliver perspectival knowledge of phenomena; they do not deliver perspectival facts.4
Different scientific perspectives privilege different kinds of data, e.g. depending on
whether one is studying water electrolysis, black-body radiation, or electromagnetic
induction, as we shall see below. And they use those data to provide evidence for the
phenomenon at stake within the technological, experimental, and theoretical resources
available to each. Thus, the ensuing data-to-phenomena inferences are thoroughly per-
spectival. The key question then becomes: how do we come to agree that something
is and what it is, in spite of our (thoroughgoingly perspectival) ways of knowing? My
main upshot is to show in historical detail how pluralism about ways of knowing is not
necessarily a hurdle to realist commitments in science, pace Kuhn’s influential por-
3 See for a discussion of Kuhn (1993, 2000), Hacking (1993) and Massimi (2015a).
4 I have discussed elsewhere (Massimi 2015b) possible semanticways of reading and understandingGiere’s
(2006) own version of scientific perspectivism, as well as the semantic argument behind the late Kuhn’s own
view (Massimi 2015a). Other varieties of perspectivism focusmore directly on the semantic nature of knowl-
edge claims. For example, Teller (2011, 2018, 2020) has argued for a kind of perspectivism that focuses on
what he calls “semantic alter-egos”—namely, false precise statements (e.g. “John’s height is six feet precise-
ly”) that can get transformed into true yet imprecise ones (e.g. “John’s height is six feet close enough”), see
Teller (2011, p. 469).A ground-clearing remark is in order here. There are different possibleways of thinking
aboutwhat does the heavy-liftingwhen it comes to perspectival knowledge.Oneway is to focus on the role of
main theoretical terms and how perspectival meaning-change might affect possible reference continuity and
associated realist commitments. Another way (the one I am pursuing here) stresses the epistemic commit-
ments that agents are willing to take when engaging with perspectival data-to-phenomena inferences. There
is no denying that any knowledge claim comes with a semantic component. But the difference between the
two approaches concerns what is doing the work for the ‘agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing’: i.e.
reference-continuity for main theoretical terms versus truth-conducive conditionals-supporting inferences.
The two do not have to be construed as antithetical to one another. On the contrary, they just place a different
emphasis on the process of ‘agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing’.
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trait of how disagreement plays out in the realist arena. On the contrary, perspectival
disagreement can deliver on realism in a non-lucky way.
Section 2 tackles the nature of perspectival disagreement in science before illus-
trating it at work with the historical case study. Section 3 presents three scientific
perspectives that at the turn of the last century jointly shaped our realist view about the
electric charge: J.J. Thomson’s Faraday–Maxwell perspective (Sect. 3.1); Grotthuss’
and Helmholtz’s electrochemical perspective (Sect. 3.2); and Max Planck’s quantum
perspective (Sect. 3.3). In Sect. 4, I return to the discussion of ontological commitment
and clarify what kind of realism is compatible with perspectival disagreement, and I
draw some concluding remarks in Sect. 5. But before I embark on this journey, let me
explain and motivate the choice of this particular case study.
Why engage with the history of the electric charge? While it is very attractive
to engage with the history of long-defunct entities (be they caloric, phlogiston, the
ether, or whatever else) to challenge the received wisdom about realism in science,
the history of the electric charge does not lend itself naturally to such an exercise. The
electric charge has had an enviably successful track record. The ether—postulated in
the Queries added to Newton’s Opticks—was abandoned at the turn of the twentieth
century. Caloric—still visible in Dalton’s drawings of atoms at the start of the nine-
teenth century—was dismissed in the first half of the nineteenth century. Electrical and
magnetic fluids, widely used in the early days by Ampère and others, have similarly
gone. But the electric charge, whose history is surprisingly entangled with that of the
ether, thermal phenomena, and electrical fluids, has survived to the present day. It is
the history of this survival around 1897–1906 that I want to briefly recount in what
follows, not for the sake of history as such, but for the sake of clarifying where our
realist commitment originates from and the role of perspectival disagreement in it.
In the literature, attention has been paid to the electron more than to the electric
charge itself as a minimal natural unit. In the late nineteenth century, the electron
was first regarded as the minimal unit of electric charge (by George J. Stoney in the
1870s); then as a structural element of an elastic ether (by George Fitzgerald and
Joseph Larmor); and then as a corpuscle (by J.J. Thomson in 1897), just to mention
a few examples. In the early twentieth century, the scientific representations of the
electron similarly underwent major changes with the discovery of the electron spin
(by Pauli, Kronig, Uhlenbeck, and Goudsmith in 1924–1925), and Dirac’s relativistic
equation for the electron in 1926. Unsurprisingly, historians and philosophers have
been fascinated with the history of the electron as a case study to better understand
the evolution of our scientific representations (see, for example, Arabatzis’s excellent
2006 book). Three main philosophical stances can be found in the literature.
1. Entity realism and scientific realism. Some philosophers have argued that the
realist commitment to the electron is unscathed by historically changing representa-
tions. The burden of such realism is usually carried by the causal theory of reference
(the typical semantic weapon in the realist arsenal). If the reference of a theoreti-
cal term is fixed not by a description (which might come and go with our changing
representations) but by its role in a causal baptism, reference continuity (and realist
commitment) is secured (think of Hacking: “if you can spray electrons, they are real”,
based on Putnam’s causal theory of reference). Scientific realists go further and argue
asAnjanChakravartty has for example done that “Entities are capable of these relations
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because of the properties they have, and properties and relations are preciselywhat the-
ories describe, so by asking the realist to believe only in the existence of certain entities
but not further aspects of theories, the entity realist (ER) asks too much. …Although
theories regarding the nature of an entity might change over time, one might carry
one’s knowledge of its existence throughout… indeed, starting with Thomson, Robert
Millikan, Ernest Rutherford and throughout the twentieth century, a long line of exper-
imentalists interacted with the same entity….Perhaps not all of these experimenters
had sufficient causal knowledge of the electron to satisfy ER—not all manipulated
it, for instance—but no doubt many met the required standard” (Chakravartty 2007,
pp. 31–32).
2. Property realism. Other philosophers have gone selective in their realist com-
mitment. For example, Bain and Norton (2001, pp. 454–461) have argued that the
history of the electron is not one of pessimistic but optimistic induction because the
sequence of theories from Thomson to Millikan, Bohr, Pauli, and Dirac highlighted
a “growing core of historically stable properties of the electron”: from the electric
charge to the mass, from the angular momentum to the spin. Realist commitment to
properties goes hand in hand with the reliability of experimental methods in detecting
and overdetermining the measured values of the relevant properties.
3. Coherent holism. A less sanguine realist commitment to the electron can be
found in Norwood Russell Hanson5 and Henry Margenau,6 both of whom warned
against the limit of applying classical mechanical images to quantum entities. What
is it that we are committed to when we claim to have very accurate knowledge of
the electron, if the electron is neither a particle nor a wave? By contrast with entity
realism, scientific realism and property realism, coherent holism takes a more decisive
anti-realist stance. On this view, not only is any attempt at producing images or rep-
resentations of the electron fraught with difficulties. But it is also an idle exercise, for
it naïvely (and mistakenly) assumes that those representations carry the burden of our
realist commitments. A somewhat similar approach can be found in a contemporary
trend in epistemology that places non-factive understanding (rather than knowledge)
centre-stage.7 The price to pay for this move, however, is to replace knowledge (which
implies justified true beliefs) with non-factive understanding.8
Where does this discussion leave us? Of the three philosophical views here briefly
sketched, the third concedes too much to holism and non-facticity, in my view. It
is one thing to claim with Hanson and Margenau that the electron is subject to a
“radical unpicturability”. It is another thing to conclude that therefore our different
representations of the electron are all equally non-factive. There is a sense in which
granularity matters in science. For it allows us to ascertain what J.J. Thomson got
right, and what he got wrong about what he called the ‘corpuscle’. It is the granularity
of scientific knowledge claims, our ability to assess each and every of them as either
5 See Hanson (1958/1972, pp. 123–125).
6 See Margenau (1950, pp. 321–322).
7 Elgin (2017), for example, defends a kind of non-truth-conducive non-factive understanding about sci-
entific practice. And in this context, she gives the example of the positron (Elgin 2017, p. 221).
8 Non-factive holistic understanding denies the granularity of scientific knowledge claims (whereby, say,
J.J. Thomson’s knowledge claim about the charge-to-mass ratio was factive and true, but his knowledge
claim about electrons being scattered in the atoms like plums in a pudding was non-factive and false).
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true or false that enables scientists across different perspectives to retain or withdraw
individual knowledge claims that might either continue to serve them well or fail
to do so over time. Thus, while I agree that understanding is an important feature of
scientific inquiry, itwould be interesting to explore hownon-factive understandingmay
complement truth-conducive knowledge (rather than taking the former as antithetical
to the latter). What is it like to gain a better understanding of the electric charge, for
example?
At the other hand of the spectrum, realism (be it entity realism or scientific realism)
has traditionally faced a problem when dealing with the history of science. The fact
that our representations of the electron (and the electric charge) have changed over
time cannot easily be brushed aside in the name of the causal theory of reference.
Entity realists have a point here against scientific realism. Realist commitments do
not necessarily require full-blown theories. The kind of commitment to the electric
charge delivered by Millikan’s oil-drop experiment is not necessarily the same kind
of commitment delivered by, say, Dirac’s relativistic equation of the electron. What is
missing in scientific realism is once again the ability to tease out upfront (i.e. not with
wisdom of hindsight) which knowledge claims are true, and which are false, when a
theory as a whole gets superseded.
This leaves us with property realism as the most attractive philosophical view out
of these three. There is a lot to like in the idea of a “growing core of historically
stable properties of the electron”: it provides us with a metaphysical tether, without
buying into any inflated metaphysics. It accounts for the historical evolution of our
representations without sacrificing realist commitments. However, property realism
seems to displace the bump in the carpet. For the thorny question “What is really an
electron?” becomes the (equally thorny) question “What is really the electric charge?”,
as a property that has grown stable in the cluster of properties we tend to identify the
electron with.9 Did scientists ever disagree about the electric charge? Before I give
the historical details that belie intuitions about the metaphysics of ready-made natural
properties in Sect. 3, let us get clear about the nature of scientific disagreement at play
whenever there is a plurality of scientific perspectives.
2 Perspectival disagreement in science
The vast recent literature on peer disagreement (cf. Feldman and Warfield 2010 for
an overview) has concentrated on cases where ‘peers’ who have access to the same
evidence and share the same ability to reason might nonetheless disagree. Most of the
debate has revolved around the question of what is rational to do in the circumstances.
The two main views—conciliatory and steadfast theorists—have argued, respectively,
for the need to revise one’s own beliefs in the light of the peer disagreement; or to
remain steadfast in one’s own belief despite peer disagreement (see Christensen and
Lackey 2013 for an extensive treatment). Perspectivism has featured in this debate in
9 In what follows, I shall exclusively concentrate my attention to the question of what the electric charge
is. I will not attempt to address the broader question of what the electron is (as a natural kind) because




the effort to link rationality to an individual’s point of view, namely what would be
rational for an individual to believe given available evidence, principles of logic, and
possible defeaters and undercutters. Kvanvig (2013), for example, offers an interesting
defence of a fully perspectivalist account, whereby rationality is perspectival in the
sense that whether a behaviour is considered rational depends on the “egocentric point
of view of the individual in question” (p. 224).
In what follows, I do not connect perspectivism directly with what is rational to
believe, or with rationality in general. I am interested instead in how epistemic agents,
or, better, epistemic communities, who might endorse different scientific perspectives
(as defined in Sect. 1) might disagree in a distinctive way. The kind of perspectival
disagreement at play in bona fide scientific scenarios is often enough justificatory,
and not factual. It does not concern how informed each interlocutor is, whether or
not they have access to the same data and pieces of evidence. Often enough, gen-
uine scientific disagreement arises despite peers having access to the same data and
empirical observations. It does not concern how competent each interlocutor is either;
whether they each follow rules of logic and probabilistic reasoning. Presumably, they
all do insofar as their activities can be described as bona fide scientific (as opposed to
unscientific, pseudo-scientific, propagandistic or similar other cases which I will not
discuss). Thus, the kind of perspectival disagreement that I am here focussing on is
disagreement between interlocutors who can legitimately claim the same competence.
It is justificatory in nature because, despite access to the same evidence and same com-
petence in the rules of logic and probabilistic reasoning, scientists may nonetheless
disagree in the way they come to justify their respective beliefs.10
Epistemic communities working in different scientific perspectives might dis-
agree at different levels, and for different reasons. Sometimes the disagreement
affects the very scientific knowledge claims11 that they respectively endorse. Other
times, they disagree in that they might adopt different experimental, theoretical,
and technological resources to reliably make those scientific knowledge claims.
And, on yet other occasions, they disagree by subscribing to different second-
order (methodological-epistemic) principles to justify the scientific knowledge claims.
Perspectival disagreement so understood is at a distance fromKuhnian incommensura-
bility because it is a piecemeal multi-level process. It is not a matter of all-or-nothing,
‘living in a new world’, or Gestalt switches. For perspectival disagreement envis-
ages the possibility that two or more epistemic communities from different scientific
perspectives12 might agree about either the reliable experimental procedures or the
10 I am here taking my cue from perspectivalist accounts of justification in epistemology such as Sosa
(1991) and Rosenberg (2002).
11 A clarification about the terminology here. It might seem tautologous to talk about reliability and
justification when talking about “scientific knowledge claims” for the very notion of knowledge as justified
true belief presupposes both. Please note, the expression is used here to stress the “claims of knowledge”
advanced by different scientists in different historical epochs and across different scientific perspectives.
In some cases they did amount to genuine knowledge, in other cases they did not because the belief in
question, although justified and sometimes even reliably generated, was nonetheless false (think of George
Fitzgerald’s belief that material bodies would contract as a way of making sense of the Michelson–Morley
experiment; or Priestley’s belief that phlogiston was released in combustion).
12 I am here assuming “different scientific perspectives” that are nonetheless sufficiently close in historical
terms for the inter-conversational disagreement to take place. A medieval alchemist and a twentieth-century
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justificatory principles, while also disagreeing on which scientific knowledge claims
these in turn support. Let us briefly look at two famous examples to illustrate this
point.
Consider the Michelson–Morley experiment in 1887 giving null evidence for the
phenomenon of the ether drag. Michelson and Morley devised an experiment with an
instrument called the interferometer to detect whether the Earth was indeed moving
through a subtle invisible substance called the ether. But no evidence for it was found.
While no one doubted the reliability of the experiment, in 1889George Fitzgerald took
it as a springboard for accommodating this piece of negative evidence with the then
accepted Fresnel–Lorentz theory of the luminiferous ether, assuming that the negative
experimental result must have been due to some kind of contraction.13
By contrast, a few years later, Einstein took it as evidence for the conclusion that
the ether of Newtonian origin did not exist. The disagreement between Fitzgerald’s
still classical perspective and Einstein’s new relativistic perspective can be regarded
as an example of perspectival disagreement at the level of scientific knowledge claims
effected by adopting different second-order (methodological-epistemic) justificatory
principles on the same data.14 Einstein’s commitment to what became known as the
principle of relativity and the light principle led him to interpret the data from the
Michelson–Morley experiment as evidence for the knowledge claim that the ether
does not exist and that simultaneity is relative to inertial reference frames. Without
these two principles, Fitzgerald in 1889 interpreted the Michelson–Morley data as
licensing a different kind of knowledge claim (which eventually proved wrong).
On other occasions, the perspectival disagreement at the level of scientific knowl-
edge claims isn’t effected by a divergence in (second-order) justificatory principles,
but instead by a divergence in what one counts as reliable experimental (or theoret-
ical) procedure. For example, while both Priestley and Lavoisier undoubtedly were
committed to simplicity15 as a justificatory principle for their respective scientific
knowledge claims, they disagreed on the reliability of gravimetric methods as a way
Footnote 12 continued
chemist would be too far away from each other historically to be able to even enter into any such dis-
agreement, so I won’t consider this kind of historically far-fetched perspectival scenarios in what follows.
Instead, my analysis applies to Kuhnian scenarios of historically contiguous epistemic communities, and it
goes beyond Kuhn in considering disagreement among various scientific perspectives at play at the same
historical time (not just one paradigm after another).
13 See Brown (2001) for a historical and philosophical analysis of this famous episode in the history of
relativity theory.
14 A clarification on this point is in order. Although of course Einstein took these principles as well-
established general claims about the world, they play a second-order methodological role in laying the
foundations of what might be called the ‘Einsteinian perspective’, to echoGiere (2006). In other words, with
these principles in place, it becomes then possible to derive consequences such as relativity of simultaneity,
time dilation and length contraction as reliable first-order knowledge claims.
15 On a popular historiographic view, phlogiston theory was disproved because it could not explain why
calcinated metals were heavier (rather than lighter) than the original metals, as one would expect if cal-
cination involved the release of phlogiston. That is the way Lavoisier himself presented his own view as
achieving “greater simplicity” than his rivals (see Lavoisier 1799, p. 271): “Are the heat and light, which
are disengaged during the different species of combustion, furnished by the burning body, or by the oxygen
which combines in all these operations?… it belongs to those who make suppositions to prove them; and
doubtless a doctrine, which without suppositions explains the phenomena as well, and as naturally, as theirs
does by supposition, had at least the advantage of greater simplicity.” But Joseph Priestley, too, appealed to
a principle of simplicity. See, for example, Priestley’s discussion of how it would be highly unphilosophical
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of measuring gases as evidence for or against phlogiston.16 Hence, their disagreement
on whether phlogiston had in fact been released in combustion (rather than oxygen
being combined with carbon in charcoal) was due to a divergence in what each of
them counted as a reliable experimental procedure to assess the evidence in their own
respective scientific perspectives.
Disagreement either at the second-order level of justificatory principles or at the
first-order level of what counts as a reliable procedure results in disagreement at the
level of the scientific knowledge claims. What typically happens in these situations
is that one claim of knowledge proves true (e.g. Einstein’s and Lavoisier’s) and the
rival proves false (e.g. Fitzgerald’s and Priestley’s). Such verdicts typically depend on
whether either the second-order justificatory principles (e.g. the principle of relativity)
or the first-order reliability of the procedure (e.g. gravimetric methods) is in turn truth-
conducive. When assessed from the point of view of our current scientific perspective,
which has ‘retained’ Einstein’s principles and Lavoisier’s gravimetric methods (but
withdrawn Fitzgerald’s and Priestley’s rival principles andmethods), it is easy to make
this kind of judgement.
Obviously, as historians of science have repeatedly stressed, the hard question con-
cerns how to reach such verdicts at the time when perspectival disagreements first
arose and took place.17 It goes beyond the scope and remit of the present paper to
address this specific and important challenge. But at least the benefit of a perspectival-
ist account should already be evident. Perspectivism locates the disagreement about
scientific knowledge claims at the meta-level (first- or second-order) concerning the
reliability or justification of the procedures for generating scientific knowledge claims.
It does not make any of the two disagreeing interlocutors/epistemic communities less
rational than the other, for they can equally and legitimately claim to be competent and
well informed. It does not dissolve disagreement either. But it resolves it eventually.
I cannot attend in this paper to the task of offering any systematic analysis of how
such resolution happens in historical terms. Let me instead concentrate on a somewhat
easier scenario.
Consider the reverse case of perspectival disagreement where two epistemic agents
this time agree on scientific knowledge claims while disagreeing either at the second-
order level of justificatory principles, or at the first-order level of what counts as
a reliable procedure. The underlying question here is how to agree whilst perspec-
tivally disagreeing. Or, in other words, how it is possible for different epistemic
agents/communities to reach the same conclusion, perspectival differences notwith-
standing. These are the cases that I am interested in exploring in what follows. What
has to be said about them? Two preliminary remarks are in order.
First, the temptation to dismiss such cases as trivial and epistemically uninteresting
is misguided. One might be tempted to think: “if epistemic agents agree in the end,
where is the problem?”. No matter how they reached agreement, the fact that they
did agree might seem to show that there is no problem about disagreeing in this
Footnote 15 continued
to conclude that there must be more than one cause for the phenomenon of matter’s resistance different
from repulsive power in Disquisitions (1782, vol. 1, p. 17).
16 For the importance of gravimetric methods in Lavoisier, see Gough (1988, pp. 17–20); and Bensaude-
Vincent (1992).
17 See Chang (2012) for a discussion of the Lavoisier–Priestley controversy.
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case. However, this would be a hasty conclusion to draw. For an explanation of how
they could agreewhilst perspectivally disagreeing is still required. Agreement between
epistemic agentswho endorse different scientific perspectives cannot accrue by chance
and luck: namely, they cannot just happen to agree regardless of how perspectivally
different their justificatory principles or reliable procedures for the generations of such
knowledge claims were. Agreeing whilst perspectivally disagreeing has to satisfy an
epistemological anti-luck requirement for scientific knowledge claims (to echo here
Pritchard’s 2005 on anti-luck epistemology).18
Second, agreeing whilst perspectivally disagreeing has to satisfy also a non-self-
defeating requirement. Perspectivism would become moot if it proved to be the case
that in the end there is an overarching perspective (some kind of Ur-perspective)
defining rationality and to which every single scientific perspective is reducible. Thus,
the burden is on perspectivalists to articulate an account of scientific disagreement that
does not ultimately collapse into a non-perspectivalist account.
In the following sections, I take some preliminary steps towards articulating an
account of perspectival disagreement in science that satisfies both the anti-luck and
the non-self-defeating requirements. Such an account relies on there being inferential
patterns that allow scientists to agree on what there is and about what it is, even if
their data-to-phenomena inferences are perspectival at the second-order justificatory
level. I argue that all that is required for this ‘agreeing whilst perspectivally disagree-
ing’ to happen in a non-lucky and non-self-defeating way is that epistemic agents are
willing to engage in truth-conducive conditionals-supporting inferences licensed by a
historically identified group of rather diverse phenomena across different perspectives.
No incommensurability or incompatibility arises here. Our veridically and justifiably
asserting that there is an electric charge e as a fundamental natural unit is the out-
come of truth-conducive conditionals-supporting inferences licensed by a historically
identified group of rather diverse phenomena.
Key to my argument is that our coming to agree about the electric charge is not
a matter of winners or losers; of one scientific perspective prevailing over another,
or imposing itself on others. It is instead a matter of science being a fundamentally
social and cooperative inquiry, where progress takes place not in spite of but thanks
to a plurality of scientific perspectives. Scientific progress is ultimately the story of
our coming to agree whilst perspectivally disagreeing. I see three main elements at
play in this story: (a) scientists willingness to engage in certain kinds of inferences;
(b) the conditionals-supporting nature of those inferences; and (c) their being truth-
conducive. Let me say something here on (a) and I shall return in more detail on (b)
and (c) in Sect. 4.
Scientific knowledge is not given to us on a silver plate, under the view presented
here. Nor is it gained by accidentally peeking behind the veil of Maya and catching a
glimpse of an underlying metaphysical reality. Scientific knowledge is our historical-
social achievement. It is something scientific communities effect over time, within the
18 As Pritchard has argued, knowledge as justified true belief cannot accrue by chance and luck, as in the
‘fake barn’ scenario where someone sees what seems to be a barn and forms the true justified belief that
there is a barn and it turns out that it was just a lucky guess: for what the person has seen is in fact a painted
façade of a barn hiding a real barn in the back. Similarly, our agreeing that there is the electric charge cannot
be a lucky guess for it to count as knowledge.
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historical boundaries afforded by their scientific perspectives and in continuous dia-
loguewith other scientific perspectives. Thewillingness to engagewith other epistemic
agents occupying different scientific perspectives (synchronically and diachronically)
is, then, key to perspectivism as a pluralist view about ways of knowing. Without
this component, perspectivism could be easily conflated with a version of epistemic
relativism;19 or, with some kind of epistemic solipsism (with each community trapped
in its own perspective and unable to step outside it).
The willingness to engage is broadly and loosely understood here along the lines of
Brandom’s inferentialism (1998, p. 389), where in “calling what someone has ‘knowl-
edge’ one is doing three things: attributing a commitment that is capable of serving
both as premise and as conclusion of inferences relating it to other commitments,
attributing entitlement to that commitment, and undertaking that same commitment
oneself. Doing this is adopting a complex, essentially socially articulated stance or
position in the game of giving or asking for reasons.”
To be more precise, I see our coming to unanimously agree that something is and
about what it is as the outcome of conditionals-supporting inferences. In the histor-
ical example I examine in Sect. 3, the social game of giving or asking for reasons
becomes the game of considering a number of phenomena (let us call them P1, P2,
P3) that at the time had been historically identified via a plurality of data-to-phenomena
inferences. Such phenomena included the electrolysis of water; the bending of cath-
ode rays; and the black-body radiation, among others. Each of these modally robust
phenomena was evinced from data via methods, experimental and theoretical tech-
niques, modelling practices that were all genuinely diverse and perspectival. Planck
was not working on electrochemistry; nor was Thomson studying the quantum of
action.
Consider, for example, the two phenomena of water electrolysis (P1) and elec-
tromagnetic induction (P2). The former takes place at the level of molecules for
the chemical electrolytes. The latter occurs at the level of the interaction between
magnetism and electricity and affects the very nature of electricity, on which wildly
diverging views existed throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ry—from Galvani’s animal electricity to Volta’s metallic electricity; from Ampère’s
electrical fluids to Faraday’s tubes. One of the challenges for scientists like J.J. Thom-
son at the end of the nineteenth century was to try and reconcile the continuous
field-theoretical nature of phenomenon (P2), with the discrete corpuscular-like nature
of phenomenon (P1). The models Thomson used to this effect were mainly heuristic
or exploratory. They did not represent the target system (the electric charge) either as
seen from the perspective of electrochemistry or as seen from the perspective of elec-
tromagnetism, with ensuing inconsistent property ascription. Their role was instead
to enable J.J. Thomson and other scientists at the time, who were willing to engage
in this social game of giving and asking for reasons, to make inferences about the
relevant phenomena and their identified lawlike dependencies. But what kind of infer-
ences are here at play? And what lawlike dependencies? Before I can continue with
19 After all, perspectivism shares with relativism the rejection of the monist idea of a single neutral stand-
point and it equally embraces a kind of epistemic pluralism, so it might be tempting to read it along the
lines of a kind of relativism (see Ashton 2020 for this line of argument).
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my philosophical account, a closer (albeit brief) look at the historical details of this
fascinating episode is in order.
In Sect. 3, I illustrate how the realist commitment to the electric charge origi-
nated from a number of perspectival inferences around 1897–1906. These inferences
involved three main scientific perspectives of the time: the Faraday–Maxwell
field-theoretical perspective, in which J.J. Thomson was working (Sect. 3.1); the
electrochemical perspective, to which Grotthuss and Helmholtz (among many oth-
ers) contributed (Sect. 3.2); and the emerging quantum perspective championed by
Max Planck (Sect. 3.3). Evidence for the electric charge appeared, independently, in
each of these three different perspectives, no matter how diverse the data and the phe-
nomena were in each case. At no point was the reliability of each procedure called
into question by practitioners of another one. Thus, the perspectival disagreement
here at stake is instead at the second-order level of justificatory principles. Our realist
commitment to the electric charge as a minimal natural unit came out of the fruit-
ful interactions among these three scientific perspectives; out of the willingness of
their main epistemic agents to engage with one another via a series of truth-conducive
conditionals-supporting inferences, whose nature I tease out in Sect. 4.
3 The rise of the natural unit of electric charge ca. 1897–1906
3.1 J.J. Thomson’s Faraday–Maxwell perspective
In 1906, J.J. Thomson was awarded the Nobel Prize for his “theoretical and experi-
mental investigations on the conduction of electricity by gases”.20 The Prize caption
did not mention the electron as such because—as is well known among historians of
physics—Thomson’s pioneering experiments with cathode rays in 1897–8 did not lead
him to the conclusion that ‘the electron exists’ (he did not use the term ‘electron’ even
in his Nobel Prize speech, but rather ‘corpuscle’). The Presentation Speech by J.P.
Klason, President of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, is particularly telling
when read in conjunction with Thomson’s own acceptance speech. Klason mentioned
Thomson’s work with H.A. Wilson (building on C.T.R. Wilson’s method) concerning
the discharge of electricity through gases, and presented Thomson as following in the
footsteps of Maxwell and Faraday, especially Faraday’s 1834 discovery of the law of
electrolysis, which had shown
that every atom carries an electric charge as large as that of the atom of hydrogen
gas, or else a simple multiple of it corresponding to the chemical valency of
the atom. It was, then, natural to speak, with the immortal Helmholtz, of an
elementary charge or, as it is also called, an atom of electricity, as the quantity
of electricity inherent in an atom of hydrogen gas in its chemical combinations.
Faraday’s law may be expressed thus, that a gram of hydrogen, or a quantity
equivalent thereto of some other chemical element, carries an electric charge
of 28,950×1010 electrostatic units. Now if we only knew how many hydrogen




atoms there are in a gram, we could calculate how large a charge there is in every
hydrogen atom.21
Interestingly enough, having just presented J.J. Thomson as the scientist who “by
devious methods” was able to answer this puzzle, Klason added (almost as a caveat to
the rationale for the Prize) that “even if Thomson has not actually beheld the atoms, he
has nevertheless achievedwork commensurable therewith, by having directly observed
the quantity of electricity carried by each atom. … These small particles are called
electrons and have been made the object of very thoroughgoing researches on the part
of a large number of investigators, foremost of whom are Lenard, last year’s Nobel
Prize winner in Physics, and J.J. Thomson.”22 The qualification “even if Thomson has
not actually beheld the atoms” is important and telling at the same time. For the fact
that Thomson did not refer to his particles as ‘electrons’ was not just a terminological
matter: he did not quite see them as genuine particles having inertial mass,23 and
believed that there were positive and negative electric charges whose field-theoretical
behaviour was captured by what elsewhere he had called a ‘Faraday tube’ (more on it
here below).
But today we do not recall J.J. Thomson for his beliefs about the Faraday tubes.
He has gone down in history as the discoverer of the electron. And for good rea-
sons too, thanks to his precise experiments on cathode rays: by exhausting vacuum
tubes so that very little air was left (which could interfere by acting as an electric
conductor), Thomson was able to determine the velocity v of cathode rays, which
he found to be 1/3 the velocity of light. And, using classical laws of electrostatics
and magnetism, he could measure the displacement of the cathode rays in the pres-
ence of an electric field. From these experiments, he was able to establish that there
must have been a charge-to-mass ratio (e/m, or better m/e as Thomson still referred
to it in 1897) at work in the modally robust phenomenon of the bending of cathode
rays.
The charge-to-mass value was found to be stable under a range of changes in
background conditions (to use JimWoodward’s terminology): it was found to be inde-
pendent of the velocity, independent of the kind of metal used for the electrodes, and
independent of the gas used in the tube.24 Most interestingly, under an additional range
of interventions, the same lawlike dependency between charge andmass was observed
21 Presentation Speech by Professor J.P. Klason, President of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
on December 10, 1906. In https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/1906/ceremony-speech/, accessed 1
October 2018.
22 Ibid.
23 In the rest of the Presentation Speech, Klason remarks that “From experiments carried out by Kaufmann
regarding the velocity of ß-rays from radium, Thomson concluded that the negative electrons do not possess
any real, but only an apparent, mass due to their electric charge,” and referred to more recent work by
Thomson “in the present year (1906)” that “seem[s] to intimate that only about a thousandth part of the
material is apparent and due to electric forces”. Ibid.
24 Thomson run a series of experiments to test whether the electrostatic deflection was proportional to the
electric intensity of the rays. He used air, hydrogen, carbonic acid as different gases, and as cathode he
used different materials from aluminium to platinum from which he concluded that “the value of m/e is
independent of the nature of the gas, and that its value 10−7 is very small compared with the value 10−4,
which is the smallest value of this quantity previously known, and which is the value for the hydrogen ion
in electrolysis” Thomson (1897, p. 310).
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to hold stably across a number of other phenomena at different scales, including water
electrolysis in chemistry on which I return in the next Section.
Since the beginning of his career at the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge in the
1880s (and still visibly in the 1893 book Notes on Recent Researchers in Electricity
and Magnetism), Thomson’s research on electric discharge in gases took place within
a well-defined scientific perspective, popular in Cambridge at the turn of the twentieth
century: I am going to call it the Faraday–Maxwell perspective.25 This was primarily
concerned with electromagnetism: namely, the interconversion of electricity and mag-
netism observed by Ørsted in Denmark and Faraday in England in the 1820s, and to
explain which Maxwell in the early 1860s produced mechanical models of the ether
(the so-called ‘honeycomb model of the ether’). This scientific perspective centred on
the field-theoretical analysis of the electromagnetic field. One of the models employed
in the Faraday–Maxwell perspective still at the time of J.J. Thomson was the so-called
‘Faraday tube’, which physically conceived of “tubes of electric force, or rather of
electrostatic induction, … stretching from positive to negative electricity”.26
Faraday tubes were a visual semi-classical way of conceiving of the electric field as
a collection of ethereal vortex tubes, carrying electrostatic induction, andwith negative
and positive charges at each end. Thomson toyed with the model of Faraday tubes in
1891 as they allowed him to reconcile the discrete nature of electricity emerging from
electrochemical experiments withMaxwell’s electromagnetic field. Atoms of opposite
electric charge connected by a Faraday tube could serve to represent molecules of
electrolytes—polarized with the passage of electric current as in Grotthuss’ chain
model of electrolysis (see Fig. 1 below).
Yet, the Faraday–Maxwell perspective gave a perspectival representation of the
electric charge which was in stark contrast with the one emerging from the electro-
chemical perspective (as we shall see in the next Section). Already in his seminal
article, Thomson (1891, pp. 149–150) had made it clear that Faraday tubes were not
just an expedient to visualize mathematical equations, but they had instead “real phys-
ical existence” and that the contraction and elongation of such tubes and their motion
through the electric field could explain the passage of electricity through metal, liquid,
and gases, the production of current, magnetic force, and electromagnetic induction.
Twelve years later, and just three years before the Nobel Prize, Thomson returned to
the topic in the Silliman Lectures delivered in May 1903 at Yale University (Thomson
1904). These lectures provide an instructive example of his considered and long-
standing ontological commitment to the electric charge at the dawn of the new century
(just at the time when Planck was ushering in the quantum revolution). Four elements
of Thomson’s treatment of the electric charge in the Silliman Lectures areworth briefly
underlining:
25 See Falconer (1987, 2001) for an excellent historical account.
26 Thomson (1893, p. 2). See Smith (2001) for an excellent historical account of Thomson’s experiments
and intellectual background in 1897–1898. Faraday’s tubes were a way of referring to what we would now
call ‘electric flux’ as a measure of the electric field strength, with the two charges (positive and negative) at
the two ends of it.
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Fig. 1 Grotthuss’ (1806) chain model of water electrolysis represented polarized molecules of water with
the passage of electricity as forming a chain inside the electrolyte (with hydrogen having positive charge
and oxygen negative charge). Reproduced with permission from Chang (2012, Is Water H2O?, p. 84)
(a) Thomson’s treatment of the electric charge in 1903 is still deeply rooted in the
nineteenth-century Faraday–Maxwell tradition of lines of force and mechanical
ether models for electromagnetic induction.27
Thomson refers once again to the Faraday tube as a “tube of force” or a tubular
surface marking the boundaries of lines of force so that “if we follow the lines
back to the positively electrified surface from which they start and forward on
to the negatively electrified surface on which they end, we can prove that the
positive charge enclosed by the tube at its origin is equal to the negative charge
enclosed by it at its end” (ibid., p. 14). In this way Thomson explained the old
ideas of positive and negative electricity with “each unit of positive electricity in
the field … as the origin and each unit of negative electricity as the termination
of a Faraday tube” (ibid., p. 15).28
(b) The boundary between Thomson’s corpuscles and Faraday tube is a lot more
subtle than it might seem.
The mass of the Faraday tube is nothing but the mass of the bound ether, or,
as Thomson puts it, “the mass of ether imprisoned by a Faraday tube” (ibid.,
p. 39). The term ‘corpuscle’ is introduced to refer to “the negatively electrified
27 Thomson (1904, p. 5) remarks right at the outset how “Fluids were mathematical fictions intended
merely to give a local habitation to the attraction and repulsion existing between electrified bodies,” and
how “Faraday materialized the lines of force and endowed them with physical properties so as to explain
the phenomena of the electric field” (ibid., p. 9).
28 What Maxwell had called electric displacement was nothing but a certain number of Faraday tubes per
unit area, and the motion of Faraday tubes was hypothesized to explain the production of a magnetic field
as per electromagnetic induction and Ampère’s law.
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particles in the atom”, or, better, “those small negatively electrified particles
whose properties we have been discussing. On this view of the constitution of
matter, part of the mass of any body would be the mass of the ether dragged
along by the Faraday tubes stretching across the atom between the positively
and negatively electrified constituents” (p. 50). Thus, Thomson’s corpuscle is
effectively nothing but a “concentration of the lines of force on the small negative
bodies” so that “practically the whole of the bound ether is localised around these
bodies, the amount depending only on their size and charge” (ibid., p. 52).
(c) The electric charge is presented as a natural unit and its atomicity is explained
in terms of Faraday tubes.29 However, by contrast with the electrochemical per-
spective, the line of reasoning leading to Thomson’s conclusion that the electric
charge is somehow atomistic does not rely on electrolysis but onWilson’s experi-
ments on the conductivity of the vapour obtained frommetallic salts (the so-called
‘electron vapour theory’).30
(d) AnexplanationofRöntgen rays is given in classical termsof corpuscles asFaraday
tubes and with no reference to the quantum hypothesis and electrons losing part
of their quantized energy as in Planck’s contemporary treatment of the topic
(Sect. 3.3).
Starting with data about cathode rays and Wilson’s electron vapour experiments,
building on Faraday’s lines of force and Maxwell’s honeycomb model of the ether
in the 1860s, Thomson resorted to a field-theoretical model that made it possible to
infer what might happen, under the supposition that the Faraday tubes were stretched
and broken. For this conditionals-supporting inference to be truth-conducive, it had
to be the case that other perspectival data-to-phenomena inferences could be brought
to bear on it across a network of inferences that eventually guided epistemic agents
through the garden of forking paths to the correct identification of the electric charge.
This was indeed what happened in this story.
3.2 Grotthuss’ and Helmholtz’s electrochemical perspective
The Faraday–Maxwell field-theoretical perspective on electromagnetism was at some
distance from what I call the ‘electrochemical perspective’. In 1874 G. Johnstone
Stoney used Faraday’s law of electrolysis to conclude that in the phenomenon of
water electrolysis “For each chemical bond which is ruptured within an electrolyte a
certain quantity of electricity traverses the electrolyte which is the same in all cases”
29 “Hithertho we have been dealing chiefly with the properties of the lines of force, with their tension, the
mass of the ether they carry along with them, and with the propagation of the electric disturbances along
them; in this chapter we shall discuss the nature of the charges of electricity which forms the beginning and
ends of these lines. We shall show that there are strong reasons for supposing that these charges have what
may be called an atomic structure; each charge being built up of a number of finite individual charges, all
equal to each other. … if this view of the structure of electricity is correct, each extremity of the Faraday
tube will be the place from which a constant fixed number of tubes start or at which they arrive” (Thomson
1904, p. 71).
30 “Wilson found that the saturation current through the salt vapour was just equal to the current which if
it passed through an aqueous solution of the salt would electrolyse in one second the same amount of salt
as was fed per second in the hot air. … Thus whether we study the conduction of electricity through liquids
or through gases, we are led to the conception of a natural unit or atom of electricity” (ibid., p. 83).
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(Stoney 1874/1894). Stoney introduced the term ‘electron’ to describe this minimal
quantity of electricity carried by the hydrogen ion in electrolysis.31 In 1881 Helmholtz
in Germany championed the hypothesis that elementary substances were composed
of what he called “atoms of electricity”32 (or ‘ions’, as Lorentz later called them),
motivated and justified precisely by chemical studies of electrolysis going back to the
German chemist Theodor von Grotthuss, who in (1806) had published his model for
water electrolysis (Fig. 1).
The atoms of electricity were regarded here as the minimum quantity carried by
electrolytes (or, better, by the hydrogen atoms) when molecules decomposed with the
passage of electricity. Helmholtz’s argument originated from Faraday’s laws of elec-
trolysis, which established that the chemical valency (i.e. electrical charge of hydrogen
atoms, or, better, of what we now know to be valence electrons) was a fundamental unit
not amenable to being further divided. Helmholtz’s reasoning for taking the electric
charge as a physical unit (and in Britain, George J. Stoney’s analogous reasoning) was
entirely chemical, rooted in the well-known tradition of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century electrolytical experiments. What made e a minimal unit under this perspective
was the fact that it was the charge corresponding to chemical valence 1. Thus, a dif-
ferent data-to-phenomena inference was at play in this scientific perspective, one that
fed into the indicative conditional
(E.1) If hydrogen and oxygen molecules form a Grotthuss’ chain, hydrogen
molecules are released at the negative electrode.
By physically conceiving of a minimal electrical unit for the ions of electrolytes,
Grotthuss’ model could be used to explore what might happen in the well-known and
well-observed phenomenon whereby water molecules decompose with the passage of
electricity with oxygen at one end and hydrogen at the opposite end. The antecedent
of this conditional supposed point-like ‘ions’ or atoms of electricity whose chemical
valence 1 was at the time associated with the hydrogen atom in the water molecule.
Bringing this kind of information to bear on J.J. Thomson’s perspective proved key in
this story. Because as Thomson himself recounted in his Nobel Prize speech, it became
apparent that the phenomenon E/M of the hydrogen atom (known from electrolysis)
and the phenomenon e/m emerging from cathode rays within the Faraday–Maxwell
perspective were at odds with one another: a numerical discrepancy of the order e/m
1700 E/M emerged. This discrepancy led Thomson to his breakthrough:
31 In a 1874 talk presented at the British Association meeting in Belfast and entitled “On the Physical
Units of Nature”, Stoney presented this minimal quantity of electricity as “one of the three physical units,
the absolute amounts of which are furnished to us by Nature, and which may be the basis of a complete
body of systematic units in which there shall be nothing arbitrary” (Stoney 1874/1894, p. 418). But Stoney
believed that these electrons within each molecule or chemical atom were “waved about in a luminiferous
ether” and that in this motion through the ether the spectrum of each gas originated.
32 “Themost startling result of Faraday’s law is perhaps this. If we accept the hypothesis that the elementary
substances are composed of atoms, we cannot avoid concluding that electricity also, positive as well as
negative, is divided into definite elementary portions which behave like atoms of electricity. As long as it
moves about on the electrolytic liquid each ion remains united with its electric equivalent or equivalents.
At the surface of the electrodes decomposition can take place if there is sufficient electromotive force, and




We have already stated that the value of e found by the preceding method [i.e.
Wilson’s]33 agrees well with the value E which has long been approximately
known. Townsend has used amethod inwhich the value e/E is directlymeasured,
and has shown in this way also that e equal to E. Hence since e/m 1700E/M,
we have M 1700 m, i.e. the mass of a corpuscle is only about 1/1700 part of
the mass of the hydrogen atom (Thomson 1906, p. 153).
The equivalence between the value e found by Thomson within the Faraday-Maxwell
perspective and the value E for hydrogen atoms in the electrochemical perspective
suggested only one possible outcome: the mass of Thomson’s corpuscle must have
been much smaller than the mass of the hydrogen atom.
But the perspectival inferences that led to the electric charge were not confined
to phenomena about water electrolysis, X-ray gas diffusion, charged droplets, and
cathode rays bending. On the other side of the Channel, German physicists were laying
the foundations of a new scientific perspective that was soon bound to influence the
final chapter of this story.
3.3 Max Planck’s quantum perspective: the electric charge as a ‘natural unit’
In the Preface to the Second Edition of The Theory of Heat Radiation (1906/1913, p.
vii), Planck announced that his measured value for e (4.69 · 10−10) laid in between
the values of Perrin and Millikan. More importantly, he presented the idea of an
“elementary quanta of electricity” as the single most important new piece of evidence
in support of his hypothesis of the quantum of action:
Recent advances in physical research have, on the whole, been favorable to the
special theory outlined in this book, in particular to the hypothesis of an elemen-
tary quantity of action. … Probably the most direct support for the fundamental
idea of the hypothesis of quanta is supplied by the values of the elementary
quanta of matter and electricity derived from it. When, twelve years ago, I made
my first calculation of the value of the elementary electric charge and found it
to be 4.69 · 10−10 electrostatic units, the value of this quantity deduced by J.J.
Thomson from his ingenious experiments on the condensation of water vapour
on gas ions, namely 6.5 · 10−10 was quite generally regarded as the most reli-
able value. This value exceeds the one given by me by 38 per cent. Meanwhile
the experimental methods, improved in an admirable way by the labors of E.
Rutherford, E. Regener, J. Perrin, E.A. Millikan, The Svedberg and others, have
without exception decided in favour of the value deduced from the theory of
radiation which lies between the values of Perrin and Millikan.
33 The equivalence between e andEwas established thanks to thework of C.T.RWilson on cloud formation,
which made in turn possible H.A. Wilson’s measurement of charged droplets, as well as by Townsend’s
(1899) measurement of the charges of gas ions generated by X-rays. As the historian of science George
E. Smith points out, Townsend’s experiment was “predicated on Maxwell’s diffusion theory. …Townsend
inferred a magnitude for Ne, where N is the number of molecules per cubic centimetre under standard
conditions. The uniformity of this magnitude for ions of different gases and its close correspondence to the
valueNE from electrolysis (where E is the charge per hydrogen atom), then allowed Townsend to conclude,
independently of any specific value of e or N , that the charge per ion, when generated by X-rays, is the
same as the charge on the hydrogen atom in electrolysis” (Smith 2001, pp. 74–75).
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To the twomutually independent confirmationsmentioned, there has been added,
as a further strong support of the hypothesis of quanta, the heat theorem which
has been in the meantime announced by W. Nernst, and which seems to point
unmistakably to the fact that, not only the processes of radiation, but also the
molecular processes take place in accordance with certain elementary quanta of
a definite magnitude.
With these words, Planck established a tradition that proved very influential and with
far-reaching philosophical consequences. The idea that there must be an elementary
electric charge corroborated Planck’s hypothesis of quanta and showed how the appli-
cability of the hypothesis extended well beyond the radiation of the black body, and
right into the nature of matter and electricity. And there was no better evidence for
this conclusion than to identify e as a physical constant (along the lines of Planck’s
constant h) and present the experiments of Thomson, Rutherford, Perrin, andMillikan
(among others) as all equally dealing with the same task: to measure as precisely as
possible the value for the elementary charge e.34 Property realism has its roots in
Planck’s crafted presentation of the elementary charge e in the Preface to the Second
Edition of The Theory of Heat Radiation.
In Chapter 4 of the book, unsurprisingly, Planck returns to the hypothesis of quanta
and the temperature of black-body radiation originating from a system of stationary
oscillators and embarks on what in my view is an illuminating journey on the nature





he goes on to the kinetic theory of gases and discusses how to estimate the number of
hydrogenmolecules contained in 1 cm3 of an ideal gas at 0 °C and 1 atm. And from the
mean kinetic energy of translatory motion of a molecule at the absolute temperature
T 1 he concludes that the “elementary quantity of electricity or the free charge of a
monovalent ion or electron” e in electrostatic unit is equal to 4.67 · 10−10, adding that
“the degree of approximation to which these numbers represent the corresponding
physical constants depends only on the accuracy of the measurements of the two
radiation constants a and c2” (ibid., p. 173).35 In a single stroke Planck effectively
established:
1. The theoretical equivalence between the “free charge of a monovalent ion or elec-
tron” with the “elementary quantity of electricity” (where it is worth stressing
34 That Planck was keen to find a connection between his constant h and other physical constants was
revealed byMax Klein in a letter to Ehrenfest of July 6, 1905, at a time where the existence of an elementary
charge quantum e was nothing more than a conjecture. As reported by Klein, Planck was keen to find a
“bridge” between his quantum hypothesis h and the experimentally found values for e. See Gerald Holton
(1973), footnote 19, p. 176.
35 The Boltzmann constant a features in the Stefan–Boltzmann law for the radiant energy of a black
body, which relates the volume and intensity of black-body radiation to the fourth power of the absolute
temperature. Planck took its numerical value fromKurlbaum’s originalmeasurements, althoughKurlbaum’s




Planck’s ambiguous use of the double terminology of Lorentz’s ‘ions’ as inter-
changeable with Stoney’s ‘electron’).36
2. The further identification of the “elementary quantity of electricity” ewith a “phys-
ical constant” among others in the context of black-body radiation.
3. And the accuracy in the values of the physical constant e depending on the refined
measurements of radiation constants.
The ambiguity in the terminology ion/electron is symptomatic, in my view, of
Planck’s intentional disengagement with the ontological debate at the time about the
nature of e (and of atoms more generally).37 In Planck’s hands, the electric charge
proved instrumental to establishing the validity and universal applicability of the
quantum hypothesis. And, in return, what up to that point had been just a hypoth-
esis—the “ion hypothesis”, as Paul Drude still called it his Preface to the Theory of
Optics38—had become in Planck’s hands a ‘natural unit’.
The electron gas theory of the German physicist Paul Drude was an important
influence for Planck, who cited him (Planck 1906/1913, p. 179; see Kaiser 2001
on which I draw here). Interestingly enough, Drude himself was not working on
Planck’s quantum hypothesis but on metal optics, and how to explain a range of
phenomena such as dispersion of light and optical reflection frommetal surfaceswithin
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. Building on van’t Hoff’s kinetic theory of osmotic
pressure and Nernst’s theory of concentration cells in electrolysis, Drude patterned
electrical conductivity in metals on the model of the kinetic theory of gases, and used
Boltzmann’s equipartition theorem with the universal constant a to establish that “If
a metal is now immersed in an electrolyte in the case of ‘temperature-equilibrium’,
the free electrons in the metal would have the same kinetic energy as the ions in the
electrolyte” (Drude quoted in Kaiser 2001, p. 259). He was also able to derive the
Wiedemann–Franz law, which establishes that the ratio between thermal conductivity
k and electrical conductivity c is proportional to the temperature T (and to the squared
ratio between a and the electric charge e of the free electron bouncing off inside the
metal).
Planck did not speculate on the nature of the minimal unit of electricity. He was far
more interested in identifying e as a physical constant among others emerging from
his quantum hypothesis; and in establishing with accuracy the measured values of
various inter-related physical constants. In so doing, he was laying the foundations of
a very influential view about ‘natural units’.Whatmakes some units natural, according
to Planck, are two features that ever since we have tended to identify with physical
constants: namely, their objectivity and necessity.
(1) Physical constants are objective. Planck maintained that their holding does not
depend on us qua epistemic agents: it is not meant to cater to our epistemic
needs, or to our research interests. Physical constants are thus set aside from
metrological considerations that typically apply to other units of measure, for
36 See Arabatzis (2006, p. 79) for a historical reconstruction of Lorentz’s ‘ions’ vs ‘electrons’ as they were
called by Stoney, Larmor, and Zeeman.
37 I refer the reader to the excellent historical reconstruction of this episode by Arabatzis (2006, ch. 4).
38 Drude (1902) contributed to the electron gas theory and his experiments are mentioned by Planck as
additional evidence for the hypothesis of the quantum of electricity.
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there is no conventional element affecting their validity here and everywhere
else.
(2) Physical constants are necessary. They are natural because they are part of the
fabric of nature: they exist and would have existed even if humankind had not
existed (or had not developed our particular scientific history). The naturalness of
these constants (and their necessity) is tied to laws of nature, according to Planck.
Their “natural significance” is retained as long as the relevant laws “remain valid;
they thereforemust be found always the same, whenmeasured by themost widely
differing intelligences according to the most widely differing methods” (Planck
1906/1913, p. 175).39
The introduction of the “elementary quantity of electricity” e in this context sig-
nals, then, an important shift in the debate at that time about the nature of electric
charge. It signals that ontological discussions about the bearer do not matter, because
the fundamental unit is not the electron (or hydrogen atom or gas ion or corpuscle or
whatever one wants to call it), but the electric charge. And electric charge is a physical
constant (among others), whose naturalness is not at the mercy of arbitrary metrolog-
ical decisions of particular epistemic communities at particular historical times. It is
entrenched instead in its featuring in laws of nature, whose validity holds always and
everywhere.
4 Truth-conducive conditionals-supporting inferences
Let us take stock from this brief foray into the history of electric charge around
1897–1906, and go back to the kind of perspectival disagreement I presented in Sect. 2,
namely to those cases wherewe agree on the scientific knowledge claim (e.g. that there
is an electric charge and about what it is) whilst also perspectivally disagreeing on
the justificatory principles adopted to reach such a conclusion (e.g. Grotthuss’ chain
model vs. Thomson’s Faraday tubes vs. Planck’s quantum hypothesis). The reliability
of the procedures at stake in each phenomenon was never called into question: there
was no disagreement about the phenomenon of hydrogen being released at the negative
electrode in electrolysis; or about Wilson’s and Townsend’s experimental methods for
measuring e/E; or about Planck’s procedure for estimating e. But the methodological-
epistemic justificatory principles for the conclusion that ‘there is an electric charge
as a minimal natural unit’ were noticeably different in each case and distinctively
perspectival in the way described above.
The underlying question raised in Sect. 2 was: how is it possible to agree whilst
perspectivally disagreeing?Or how it is possible for different epistemic agents to reach
39 “All the systems of units which have hitherto been employed … owe their origin to the coincidence of
accidental circumstances, inasmuch as the choice of the units lying at the base of every system has been
made, not according to general points of view which would necessarily retain their importance for all places
and all times, but essentially with reference to the special needs of our terrestrial civilization. … In contrast
with this it might be of interest to note that, with the aid of the two constants h and k which appear in the
universal law of radiation, we have the means of establishing units of length, mass, time, and temperature,
which are independent of special bodies or substances, which necessarily retain their significance for all
times and for all environments, terrestrial and human or otherwise, and which may therefore be described
as ‘natural units’” (1906/1913, pp. 173–174).
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the same conclusion (e.g. that something is and what is), perspectival differences
notwithstanding?
Two requirements were identified, namely agreement between epistemic agents
(and more broadly communities) who endorse different scientific perspectives should
neither accrue by luck, nor be self-defeating in assuming an overarching perspective
to which every scientific perspective is ultimately reducible. At the end of Sect. 2, I
mentioned the inferential patterns—their (b) conditionals-supporting nature and (c)
their being truth-conducive—that ultimately explain how and why scientists do come
to agree whilst perspectivally disagreeing. It is now time to clarify these two points
in light of the historical episode just discussed. Consider the difference between the
aforementioned indicative conditional
(E.1) If hydrogen and oxygen molecules form a Grotthuss’s chain, hydrogen
molecules are released at the negative electrode
and the subjunctive conditional (let us denote the subjunctive with A rather than E)
(A.1)Were electrodes immersed inwater, hydrogenmoleculeswould be released
at the negative electrode.
Despite prima facie similarities, the two conditionals conceal a crucial difference
behind the syntactical difference between the present tense ‘are released’ and ‘would
be released’. Although the consequent is the same in both cases, namely the observable
phenomenon P1, the subjunctive mode in (A.1) conveys the objective possibility of
P1 occurring, were the antecedent condition to hold. But the indicative conditional
(E.1) conveys instead an implicit (unpronounced) epistemic possibility concerningP1,
assuming the antecedent holds.
In other words, the subjunctive mode (A.1) speaks to the modal robustness of
phenomenon P1 under the antecedent’s holding—hydrogen’s being released at the
negative electrode were electrodes immersed in water—its objective possibility being
grounded on the lawlike causal dependency between quantity of electricity and electro-
chemical decomposability established by Faraday’s law. Phenomenon P1 is modally
robust under a wide range of changes in the background conditions of the experimental
set-up (along Woodward’s interventionist view): hydrogen would still be released if
electrodes were immersed in water, regardless of the nature of the liquid or the metal
used for the electrodes, for example.
By contrast, the indicative mode (E.1) speaks to our epistemic attitudes when we
judgewhetherP1 is likely to occur in the hypothetical scenario described byGrotthuss’
model in the antecedent. This is the realm of perspectival models as heuristic models
(see Massimi 2018a). Consider now the following chain of indicative-conditionals-
supporting inferences:
(E.1) If hydrogen and oxygen molecules form a Grotthuss’s chain, hydrogen
molecules are released at the negative electrode.
(E.2) If ether vortices move as in Maxwell’s honeycomb model, electric current
is displaced.
(E.3) If a Faraday tube of electrostatic induction is stretched and broken, free
atoms of electricity are produced (be it in metal, gases, or liquid electrolytes).
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(E.4) If free atoms of electricity in metals are conceived along van’t Hoff’s
kinetic theory of osmotic pressure (as Paul Drude did), dispersion of light and
reflection of metal surfaces ensue.
(E.5) If carriers ofmetallic conductivity are conceived along themodel ofDrude’s
electron gases, the phenomenon of blackbody radiation can be calculated.
(E.6) If the monovalent hydrogen ion is conceived along the lines of Planck’s
quantum hypothesis, the quantum of electricity (measured from the radiation
constants a and c2) is equal to 4.67×10−10 in electrostatic units.
The inferential chain (E.1)–(E.6) eventually allowed physicists around 1897–1906
to conclude that something was (electric charge) and what it was (a quantum of elec-
tricity with a well-defined measurable value). ‘Electric charge’ as a fundamental unit
of nature is not just an itemised list of phenomena P1, P2, P3, … from electrochemical
decomposition to electromagnetic induction, from metal conductivity to radiant heat.
What is needed in addition is a set of instructions for epistemic agents —working
across different scientific perspectives and willing to engage with one another—to
reliably make informed decisions about how to proceed forward, what conclusions to
draw, what tentative conclusions to discard, what further novel inferences to explore
and probe about these phenomena and new ones too. These instructions take the
form of conditionals-supporting inferences like (E.1)–(E.6), for example. Models are
involved at different points in these inferences. Some of the models are perspectival,
as already indicated. But perspectival models are only a subset of a much larger and
varied family of scientific models routinely used to make these inferences, including
phenomenological models such as Drude’s electron gas one, and theoretical models
too, such as Planck’s theory of blackbody radiation.
In the example at stake, the instructions encoded by these conditionals-supporting
inferences required comparing the phenomenon P1 of E/M in the hydrogen molecules
emerging fromGrotthuss’ and Helmholtz’s work on electrolysis with the phenomenon
P3 of e/m measured by Thomson’s experiments on cathode rays as per (E.2), and
noticing a numerical discrepancy between the two.
To resolve this numerical discrepancy, a new round of data-to-phenomena infer-
ences was required that this time involved forking subjunctive conditionals. The
indicative conditional (E.3) opened up a forking inferential path, so to speak:
(A.3.a) Were e bigger than E, e/m would be much bigger than E/M;
Or,
(A.3.b) Were m much smaller than M, e/m would be much bigger than E/M.
And as new data became available (i.e. using Wilson’s technique of weighing water
droplets around negative charges, as well as J.S.E. Townsend’s experiments on the
charge of ions produced by X-rays), the choice could reliably be made in favour of
(A.3.b). This led Thomson to conclude that his corpuscle had a mass much smaller
than the hydrogen atom: it was indeed the first sub-atomic particle to be identified.
From there the step to the next further inference that there is a quantum of electricity
was a short one. A further round of data-to-phenomena inferences was required, this
time involving the comparison of J.J. Thomsonmeasured value for e (as perA.3.b)with
Planck’smeasured value derived fromhis theory of black-body radiation (viaE.4–E.6).
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And again, the discrepancy between the two opened up yet another inferential forking
path of new subjunctive conditionals:
(A.6.a) Were e a semi-classical quantity, its value would be derived from the
laws of classical electrodynamics;
Or
(A.6.b)Were e a quantum of electricity, its value would be derived from the laws
of black-body radiation.
Further measurement obtained by Rutherford, Regener, Perrin, Millkan among others,
led to more accurate estimates of the value for e and settled the choice for Planck’s
(A.6.b) eventually. In Rorty’s language, one might say that we all stand on Planck’s
grid today in taking Planck’s constant e as a minimal natural unit. Electricity got
quantized alongside with the blackbody radiation.
What we have learned about the physical constant e and a quick look at a relevant
episode in its long history is that our realist commitment to it is the outcome of
conditionals-supporting inferential chains enabled by lawlike dependencies at work in
each and every of these different phenomena. Some of these lawlike dependencies are
causal in nature, as when one observes cathode rays bending by increasing the strength
of the electric or magnetic field. Others are non-causal in nature, e.g. the relation
between half-integral spin and Fermi–Dirac statistics.40 Ultimately, it is the lawlike
dependencies in phenomena, the way they enter into forking subjunctive conditionals,
and how we go about choosing which forking path to take on the basis of available
pieces of evidence at particular historical times that underpins the truth-conducive
nature of conditionals-supporting inferences—no matter the epistemic nature of the
indicative conditionals.
Historically, the identification of the relevant lawlike dependencies in the phe-
nomenon of cathode rays constituted the main hurdle. J.J. Thomson’s experiments in
1897 and his ability to reliably settle for (A.3.b) gained him the Nobel Prize, no matter
how mistaken his beliefs about corpuscles in Faraday tubes were. Truth-conducive
conditionals-supporting inferences—reiterated and enabled by an ever-growing num-
ber of perspectival data-to-phenomena inferences—reliably lead epistemic agents to
agree that something is and what it is in spite of, or better thanks to the perspectival
variety of methodological-epistemic justificatory principles.
5 Concluding remarks: agreeingwhilst perspectivally disagreeing
Our realist commitment to the electric charge was not the result of any lucky stumbling
into natural properties hiddenbehind the veil ofMaya.Much aswe all standonPlanck’s
grid today in taking e as a physical constant, a closer look at the twists and turns in
its history around 1897–1906 should act as a reminder (and a cautionary tale) not to
conflate Planck’s own manifesto in the Preface to the Second Edition of The Theory
40 The Pauli principle does not tell a causal story as to why half-integral spin particles cannot be in the
same dynamic state, but it simply imposes a constraint to the type of state (antisymmetric) that an ensemble
of such particles is allowed to be in. There are similarities here with Lange’s (2017) account of non-causal
explanations “by constraint”, which for reason of space I cannot pursue.
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of Heat Radiation with a metaphysical guide as to what there is, any more than we
would nowadays take Newton’s Principia as a metaphysical guide to what there is.
Our realist commitment to the electric charge emerged by proceeding through
the inferential garden of forking paths, so to speak, where at each junction novel
data were brought in and determined which path to take and which one not to
take, which subjunctive conditional expresses a genuine lawlike dependency and
which one does not. That is how real historical communities over time learn how
to navigate the space of what is objectively possible: i.e., by comparing a plural-
ity of modally robust phenomena so as to make more and more refined inferences
on what might be the case at every twist and turn. This procedure is entirely fal-
libilist, anti-foundationalist, and revisable. It does not start from building-blocks
(properties, dispositions, truthmakers, or Humean mosaics). It takes seriously the
situated nature of our scientific knowledge, our starting always from somewhere
(rather than from nowhere), in the form of model-based inferential reasoning that
places centre-stage epistemic indicative conditionals. It is truth-conducive in giving
and asking for reasons as to why some paths are taken and others are not along the
way.
Perspectivism is not a backward-looking reflection on the practice of sci-
ence and its being historically and culturally situated. It is also, first and fore-
most, a forward-looking commitment to engage across scientific perspectives
and retain knowledge claims that have served us well across multiple per-
spectives. It is a perfect illustration of how scientific knowledge grows from
a perspectival point of view: how epistemic communities come to agree, and
how successful our perspectival data-to-phenomena inferences can be in deliv-
ering knowledge ‘from within’ the boundaries of what is historically conceiv-
able at any point in time. Realist commitments are to be found aplenty along
the paths we have taken walking in the historical garden of inferential forking
paths.
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